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enjoin the operation of the S-9 pumping station until the Water
District obtained an NPDES permit. The court stated that when
determining whether an injunction is proper, a court should not only
"balance the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to
them," but also "pay particular regard for the public consequences" of
the injunction. Without the operation of S-9, the western portion of
the county would flood in a matter of days, causing damage to, and
displacement of, a significant number of people. Therefore, the court
vacated the judgment awarding an injunction but ordered the Water
District to obtain an NPDES permit within a reasonable amount of
time.
Lisa M. Thompson

Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
appellate courts have jurisdiction to review modifications of consent
decrees, and that such modification is improper when there has been
no change in law or fact subsequent to the party's agreement to the
consent decree).
This case arose when the Sierra Club, along with various other
environmental organizations ("Sierra Club"), sued the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and several of the EPA's directors,
including Mr. Meiburg. Sierra Club asked that the court order the
EPA to implement total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs"), which the
EPA was required to establish under a previously established consent
decree. The Sierra Club originally brought the case in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which found
for Sierra Club. The EPA appealed, alleging the district court's
holding improperly modified the consent decree. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, and remanded the case to the
district court.
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") established a statutory and
regulatory scheme for lowering pollution levels in waters of the United
States. The CWA addresses both point source pollution, which comes
from a discernable point where pollutants are discharged, and nonpoint source pollution. When both point source and non-point source
pollutants affect waterways, the CWA requires states to list each
affected waterway in the state, and to set water quality standards for
each. If a waterway does not meet those standards, the CWA requires
states to determine TMDLs for the waterway, specifying the maximum
daily amount of each pollutant that can pass through the waterway
without violating the water quality standards. The CWA gives the EPA
approval authority over both the list of polluted waterways and the
corresponding TMDLs. If the EPA disapproves, the CWA requires it to
issue its own list or its own TMDLs. The EPA has, for the most part,
delegated authority for implementing TMDLs to the states.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

In 1994, the Sierra Club sued the EPA. The Sierra Club asserted
that Georgia had established TMDLs for only two of approximately 340
polluted waterways, and that these two were insufficient to meet the
requirements of the CWA. The Sierra Club wanted to force the EPA to
take responsibility for establishing and implementing TMDLs in
Georgia. In Sierra Club v. Hackinson, the district court granted 'the
Sierra Club summary judgment, and entered an injunction requiring
the EPA to establish and implement TMDLs in Georgia. The EPA
appealed this ruling. While the appeal was pending, the parties
agreed to a consent decree, which required the Sierra Club to establish
(but not implement) TMDLs in Georgia on a fixed schedule. At the
time of this suit, the EPA was on schedule for establishing TMDLs in
Georgia. However, Georgia had not implemented the TMDLs, nor
had they otherwise incorporated them into their pollution
management plans.
Seeking to improve water quality in Georgia, the Sierra Club
attempted to re-open the consent decree and to force the EPA to
While the case progressed, Georgia
implement the TMDLs.
implemented the TMDLs, and the EPA moved to have the case
The Sierra Club argued that Georgia's
dismissed as moot.
implementation plans were again insufficient to meet the
requirements of the CWA. The district court denied the motion, and
ruled that the EPA was obligated under the consent degree to assure
the adequacy of Georgia's implementation plans. The EPA's appeal
resulted in this case.
As a threshold issue, the court noted it only had jurisdiction if the
district court's order modified the consent decree. Modification
occurs, irrespective of the title given to the order by the district court,
when the order changes the legal relationship between the parties.
The court looks to the plain terms of the consent decree to determine
the legal relationship of the parties prior to the order. Here, before
the district court order, the EPA had a duty only to establish TMDLs.
After the order, the EPA had both a duty to establish TMDLs and a
duty to assure the TMDLs were adequately implemented. This added
duty changed the legal relationship between the parties. Thus, the
court ruled it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the district court
order.
Modification of a consent decree is only appropriate when: (1) a
significant change in factual conditions or in law has occurred; and (2)
the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstance. The court noted there had been no change in the law
since the consent decree, nor had there been a change in factual
circumstances. The relevant regulations of the Act were unchanged
since the consent decree was formalized, and the lethargy of Georgia's
implementation was likewise unchanged. Neither condition necessary
for modification of the consent decree was present, yet the district
court order imposed new duties on the EPA. Accordingly, the court
held the district court had improperly modified the consent decree.
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The decree only required that the EPA establish TMDLs. Because the
EPA had established TMDLs, the district court should have sustained
EPA's motion to dismiss the case as moot. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.
James Siegesmund
Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Env't, Inc. v. Closter Farms,
Inc., 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding the Clean Water Act did
not require that farm obtain a permit to discharge water from its water
management system into lake).
Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Environment, Inc.
("FADE") brought a Clean Water Act ("CWA") suit against Closter
Farms, Inc. ("Closter Farms") alleging that Closter Farms discharged
pollutants into Lake Okeechobee without a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. After trial, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found
the pollutants either fell within agricultural exemptions not requiring
a permit under the CWA or were covered by other permits, and
entered judgment for Closter Farms. FADE appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Closter Farms operated a sugar cane farm adjacent to Lake
Okeechobee. Closter Farms leased its land from the State of Florida,
and the lease required Closter Farms to operate a water management
system. The water management system provided drainage for Closter
Farms' lands, as well as for an airport, a wastewater treatment plant, a
county park, a vacant lot previously occupied by a tractor sales
operation, and a county road, all adjacent to Closter Farms. The water
management system took excess water from Closter Farms' irrigation
canals and pumped it into Lake Okeechobee.
Closter Farms argued it was not required to obtain a permit for two
reasons.
First, the CWA exempted discharge from agricultural
operations from the NPDES permit requirement. Second, the
adjacent properties that share the water management system all had
NPDES permits for their lands. The district court found FADE failed
to establish discharge of a non-exempt pollutant and entered
judgment for Closter Farms.
Reviewing the district court's decision de novo, the appellate court
identified two implicit findings in the district court's ruling. First, any
pollutants that originated on Closter Farms' property fell within the
agricultural exemptions of the CWA. Second, either an existing
NPDES permit or exemptions to the permitting requirements covered
pollutants that originated elsewhere.
Agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from
irrigation agriculture are exempted from the CWA permitting
requirements. FADE alleged Closter Farms' discharges were neither.

